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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Church and State
Last December the New York Court of
Appeals handed down a decision in the
widely-publicized controversy between
Brooklyn's Trinity Church and the Rev-
erend William Melish.' The Court affirmed
both a declaratory judgment establishing
the co-plaintiff, Dr. Sidener, as lawfully
elected rector and an injunction restraining
Mr. Melish, the assistant minister, from
interfering with the performance of Dr.
Sidener's rectorial duties.
Six of the eleven vestry members of the
Church had elected Dr. Sidener to serve as
rector. Mr. Melish and three co-defendant
vestrymen denied that the six electing
vestry members constituted a quorum com-
petent to act. In the New York Supreme
Court the Official Referee applied the
quorum provisions for vestry meetings, as
prescribed by Section 42 of the New York
Religious Corporations Law, 2 and found
that the presence of two churchwardens
and four vestrymen was insufficient lawfully
to elect Dr. Sidener.3
I Rector, Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish,
3 N.Y.2d 476, 146 N.E.2d 685 (1957).
2 "To constitute a quorum of the vestry or board
of trustees, there must be present either:
1. The rector and at least a majority of the
whole number of wardens and vestrymen, or
2. One churchwarden and one more than a
majority of the vestrymen or both churchwar-
dens and a majority of the vestrymen, or
3. If the rector be absent from the diocese and
shall have been so absent for over four calen-
dar months, or if the meeting be called by the
rector and he be absent therefrom or be inca-
pable of acting, one churchwarden and a major-
ity of the vestrymen, or both churchwardens
and one less than a majority of the vestrymen."
N. Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §42.
3 Rector, Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish,
3 M.2d 997, 155 N.Y.S.2d 792 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
In reversing, the Appellate Division dis-
cussed the constitutional relationship be-
tween Church and State and held that in a
matter as purely ecclesiastical as the elec-
tion of a rector, church canons alone
govern. 4 However, the Court of Appeals,
affirming, found it unnecessary to decide
upon constitutional grounds. In its con-
struction of the Religious Corporations Law
the Court found deference to church law in
the election of a rector.
The Court first examined Section 42. It
found there no specific statement that the
quorum rules applying to a vestry called
for the election of a rector. To appellant's
contention that the rule describing a
quorum exclusive of the rector 5 demands
the application of that quorum to a body
electing a rector, the Court answered that
that particular provision covered only the
special circumstance of a rector in office
refusing to call or attend a meeting. More-
over, the last sentence of Section 420 ap-
peared to the Court to make the vestry's
exercise of the power to call a rector sub-
ject to the General Canons of the Ameri-
can Church.
The Court then cited Section 25, which
excludes from any coverage of the Religious
Corporations Law the selection of a rector,
to cement its conclusion that:
4 Rector, Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish,
4 A.D.2d 256, 164 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1957).
See the second rule of N. Y. RELIC. CORP. LAW
§42, note 2 supra.
6 "The vestry may, subject to the canons of the
Protestant Episcopal church in the United States,
and of the diocese in which the parish or church
is situated, by a majority vote, elect a rector to
fill a vacancy occurring in the rectorship of the
parish, and may fix the salary or compensation of
the rector." N. Y. RELIC. CORP. LAW §42.
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*.. on their face and in their setting and in
the light of legislative history the quorum
requirements of section 42 have no refer-
ence to the election of a rector, and that the
only applicable law is the Canon Law of the
Church.7
Section 2 of General Canon 11 of the
Protestant Episcopal Church of the United
States declares that, the whole having been
called to meet, a majority of the members
of a body shall constitute a quorum, and a
majority of the quorum shall be competent
to act. The Court found compliance with
this canon and thus a valid election of Dr.
Sidener.
The decision reached seems judicious in
more than one respect. The construction
made of Section 42 of the Religious Cor-
porations Law, by which the civil regulation
of an ecclesiastical matter was precluded, is
consonant with that statute's purpose as
pronounced in St. Nicholas Cathedral v.
Kedroff.8
• . . to provide for an orderly method for
the administration of the property and tem-
poralities dedicated to the use of religious
groups and to preserve them from exploita-
tion by those who might divert them from
the true beneficiaries of the trust. 9
Since the raison d'6tre of the law is the pro-
tection of the property of religious groups,
then the law would be misused in altering
the result of a purely religious function.
Likewise, the decision seems constitu-
tionally sound. Since the Episcopal Bishop
had invested Dr. Sidener as rector, that
canonical approval of the election would
probably be binding on the courts if
pleaded. 10 Had the constitutionality of Sec-
7 Rector, Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish, 3
N.Y.2d 476, 481-82, 146 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1957).
8 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
9 Id. at 29, 96 N.E.2d at 72.
1OWatson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679
(1871). See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
tion 42 been in issue, it would probably
have been upheld if construed as in the
instant case: that its quorum regulations
validly apply to vestry meetings called for
the administration of church "property and
temporalities," but do not apply to such
meetings called for purely ecclesiastical
matters.
Although the decision favors the right of
a church to manage spiritual affairs free
from civil regulation, since it confines itself
to a construction of the statute it will
probably not be controlling on any future
Church-State issue.
The recent case of Baer v. Kolmorgen'
presented another facet of the separation of
Church and State controversy.
Petitioners sought to enjoin, pendente
lite, the School Board of Ossining, New
York, from authorizing the erection of a
Nativity scene on public school property
during the Christmas season. Petitioners
contended that this would indicate to school
children preference by school authorities
toward the Christian religion. The New
York Supreme Court denied the injunction
on the ground that petitioners had not
alleged such irreparable injury as would
support a temporary injunction and indi-
cated that any future litigation must be
based on sufficient allegations of damage.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the guarantee of free-
dom of religion contained in the First
Amendment. 2 In construing this amend-
ment, the Supreme Court has ruled that an
action which supports or aids ". . . one
dral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1 (1929).
1 170 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
2 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940).
religion, . . . all religion, or prefer[s] one
religion over another . . ." is violative of
the constitutional guarantee.3 Hence, appro-
priations to support a church, 4 or the use
of tax-supported property for religious in-
struction,5 is unconstitutional. On the other
hand, released time for students attending
religious instruction 6 and the traditional tax
exemption,7 not characterized as support,
are valid.
The disjunction between support and
non-support is not complete. Some acts
which might easily be characterized as
support have been justified on other
grounds. Federal aid to a charitable hos-
pital run by a religious corporation, for
example, is valid since the legal character of
a corporation, a secular institution, is not
affected by the religious affiliations of its
members.8 Support of American Indian
Catholic schools is valid under the Indian
Treaty. 9 Likewise, the State's interest in
education justifies giving secular textbooks
to parochial schools;10 its interest in the
safety of its young citizens allows bus trans-
portation to be provided for students at-
tending parochial schools.'1 Application of
3 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
4 Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 3, at 16
(dictum).
5 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948).
6 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
7 Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644,
298 P.2d 1, aff'd sub noma. Heisey v. County of
Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956) (per curiam).
8 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
9 Quick Bear v. Luepp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). The
trust fund provided for by the treaty belongs to the
Indians. Hence, they may validly petition for this
appropriation.
10 Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930).
11 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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the National School Lunch Act 12 to paro-
chial schools may be similarly justified.13
Such aid is given to citizens of the State, not
to religion.1
4
In the Baer case the Court might easily
have characterized the act in question as
support. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion15 held religious instruction in public
schools unconstitutional since it was the
". use of tax supported property for
religious instruction ... ."1 By analogy, the
present act might be struck down as the
use of public property for the erection of
a shrine of religious significance. The case
is distinguishable, however, since the ele-
ment of instruction, worship or propaga-
tion of religion is not actually involved.
Had the instant Court found support, an
injunction would have issued.17 But the
plaintiff's bill was held insufficient as the
damages alleged' 8 were too vague and spec-
ulative to support an injunction. 19 It would
seem, therefore, that while ostensibly leav-
12 60 STAT. 230 (1946).
13 See CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 192 (1954).
14 See Everson v: Board of Educ., supra note 11,
at 16-18. To deprive citizens of aid to which they
are entitled when they choose to send their chil-
dren to parochial schools would be discriminating
against religion.
15 333 U.S. 203(1948).
16 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
209 (1948).
17 Baer v. Kolmorgen, 170 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct.
1957). The Constitution guarantees citizens that
the State shall not support any Church. An in-
junction will issue if petitioners show ". . . that
some act is being done, threatened and imminent
which will be destructive of plaintiff's rights ..
Id. at 42.
'8 Id. at 42. "'... the psychological and sociolog-
ical effect of defendant's act is to indicate clearly
in the minds of the child a preference by public
school authorities of the Christian religion over
other religions, and acceptance and endorsement
as truth the dogma of the Christian religion, and a
corresponding rejection of other religions.' " Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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ing the constitutional question open,20 the
Court, sub silentio, found that the act was
not, on its face, support of religion.
The Court goes on, ". . . not . . . every
friendly gesture between the Church and
State should be discountenanced .... "21
In advising that further litigation predicated
upon the act complained of must be
grounded upon ". . . sufficient allegations
of damage ... ,"22 the Court implies that it
is inclined to view such an act as merely a
"friendly gesture."
The validity of acts which the Court
characterizes as "friendly gestures" is estab-
lished by authority and tradition.
The purpose of the constitutional guaran-
tee is to preserve freedom of conscience.
23
As a corollary, the State has a negative
obligation not to be hostile to religion.
24
Since absolute indifference on the part of
the State toward religion is, in practical
effect, rejection or hostility, the State should
maintain a friendly, cooperative relation
with religion. 25 Furthermore, the State has
a positive obligation to preserve such
friendly gestures. While primarily interested
in different aspects of their subject's lives
(social and spiritual respectively), since
both sovereigns are concerned with the
general good of their subjects - a practic-
ally indivisible good - cooperative inter-
20 Id. at 43.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14
(1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
8-13 (1947).
24 See Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 23, at 312-14;
Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 23, at 16,
18; Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75
A.2d 880, 882 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S.
429 (1952).
25 See Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 23, at 314.
". .. [C]allous indifference . . . would be pre-
ferring those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe." Ibid.
course is necessary for each to succeed. 26
Traditionally, "we are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."'27 The State favors religion through
privileges 28 and encourages it by ordering
secular events so as not to prevent the prac-
tice of one's religion.29 On the positive side,
many examples of "friendly gestures" sug-
gest themselves: the motto "In God We
Trust" on our coin; the invocation at leg-
islative sessions; the oaths sworn in God's
name by public officials; the maintenance of
clergymen as chaplains for our armed
forces; the churches and temples erected
on military reservations. °
It is submitted that the act complained
of in the principal case may properly be
characterized as a friendly gesture. It is
distinguishable from support cases in that
the act contributed nothing postively and
specifically to the preservation or propaga-
tion of religion.31 It is, moreover, compar-
26 By cooperating with religious authorities, the
State ". . . follows the best of our traditions. For
then it respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public services to their
spiritual needs." Zorach v. Clauson, supra note
23, at 314. See also AQuINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
I-I, q. 95, art. 3. "The end of human law is to
be useful to man .... "It must, therefore, ". . . fos-
ter religion, inasmuch as it is proportioned to the
divine law; ... to be helpful to discipline, inasmuch
as it is proportioned to the natural law; and...
further the common welfare, inasmuch as it is
proportioned to the utility of mankind." Ibid.
27 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
See also Doremus v. Board of Educ., note 24
supra.
28 See Note, 40 MINN. L. REV. 672, 678 (1956).
29 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 27, at 314.
30 See examples in Zorach v. Clauson, supra note
27, at 312-15; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 254-55 (1948) (dissenting opinion);
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d
880, 882-84 (1950).
31 Compare the principal case with McCollum v.
Board of Education where the Court objected to
the use of public school property ". . . for the
able to those acts of cooperation which rec-
ognize religion without supporting it in the
constitutional sense.3 2 Furthermore, to pro-
hibit such recognition would indicate a
hostility by secular authorities which would
be unconstitutional. 3
Mass Bequests
A recent case may have resolved a pos-
sible ambiguity in the law governing the
treatment of bequests for masses under
Section 17 of the New York Decedent
Estate Law and similar statutes in other
states. In Matter of Yadach1 the testator
bequeathed his residuary estate to certain
pastors for masses to be celebrated for the
repose of his soul and that of his wife.
These bequests aggregated -more than half
his net estate, even though he left sons
surviving him. Section 17 of the Decedent
Estate Law2 provides that no more than
half the net estate can be bequeathed "for
religious purposes" if an objection is raised
by a surviving parent, spouse, descendant,
brother or sister. The Appellate Division,
Third Department, held that the bequests
for masses were within the provisions of
dissemination of religious doctrines . . . and to
the State aiding religion by ". . . providing pupils
for religious classes." McCollum v. Board of
Educ., supra note 30, at 212.
32 See McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note
30, at 252-54 (dissenting opinion); Doremus v.
Board of Educ., supra note 30, at 882-88.
33 By prohibiting this traditional recognition of an
event of religious significance during the Christ-
mas season, there would be an implied divorce of
the State from religious sentiment.. "Devotion to
the great principles of religious liberty should not
lead us into a rigid interpretation of the constitu-
tional guarantee that conflicts with the accepted
habits of our people." McCollum v. Board of
Educ., supra note 30, at 252-54 (dissenting opin-
ion).
1 - A.D.2d. -, 172 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't
1958).
2 N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW §17.
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Section 17, and reduced them in amount
Generally speaking mass bequests hav(
been held to be bequests for religious pur.
poses, although in England it was formerl 3
held that such gifts were for superstitiou!
purposes.3 In Pennsylvania, under a statut
similar to Section 17, mass bequests werc
treated as being within the statute. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Rhymer',
Appeal,4 stated:
It cannot be doubted that in obeying the in.
junction of the testator and offering masse!
for the benefit and repose of his soul tht
officiating priest would be performing a re-
ligious service, and none the less so becaust
intercession would be specially invoked ir
behalf of the testator alone.'
A Massachusetts case, Shouler, Petitioner,'
also held that mass bequests were gifts fol
a religious purpose. This view has been ap-
proved by dictum in a New York Court ol
Appeals decision.' In Matter of Fleishfarbt
a bequest for the saying of the Yahrzeit, a
Jewish rite, for the benefit of testator's de-
ceased wife, was held to be for religious
purposes under Section 12 of the Personal
Property Law. In re Eppig's Estate9 made
the same determination in construing Sec-
tion 113 of the Real Property Law. Both
of these statutes exempt gifts for religious
purposes from the operation of the rule
against perpetuities.
Prior to Matter of Yadach, however,
there was no direct holding by any New
3 HANNAN, CANON LAW OF WILLS §646 (1st ed.
1935).
493 Pa. 142 (1880).
5 Id. at 146.
6 134 Mass. 426 (1883).
7 Matter of Morris, 227 N.Y. 141, 124 N.E. 724
(1919).
8 151 Misc. 399, 271 N.Y. Supp. 736 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
963 Misc. 613, 118 N.Y. Supp. 683 (Surr. Ct.
1909).
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York appellate court that mass bequests
were gifts "for religious purposes" under
Section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law.
Indeed, there seemed to be some confusion
on this point, mainly resulting from the
decisions in Matter of Brown"0 and Matter
of Breckwolt," both decided by Surrogate
Wingate of Kings County.
In the Brown case, the court held that
mass bequests were not gifts for religious
purposes under Section 17.12 The opinion
cited Matter of Zimmerman,13 which held
that mass bequests to individual priests, in
trust or otherwise, were not gifts to religious
or charitable organizations. The Zimmer-
man case was decided prior to the amend-
ment of Section 17,14 which inserted the
"religious purposes" clause. In Matter of
Breckwolt,' 5 the court attempted to justify
its position in the Brown case by drawing
a distinction between a bequest for the
promotion of religion as a whole and one
for a selfish purpose (the repose of the
testator's soul). Yet, two years before,
the same court had held, in Matter of
Steiner,", that a bequest for the saying of
Yahrzeit was for a religious purpose under
Section 12 of the Personal Property Law,-
even though the testator named those who
were to benefit from the ceremony. The
inconsistencies in these opinions are ob-
vious.
10 135 Misc. 611, 238 N.Y. Supp. 160 (Surr. Ct.
1929).
11 176 Misc. 549, 27 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Surr. Ct.
1941).
12 Matter of Brown, 135 Misc. 611, 238 N.Y.
Supp. 160 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
1322 Misc. 411, 50 N.Y. Supp. 395 (Surr. Ct.
1898).
14 Laws of N. Y. 1923, c. 301.
15 176 Misc. 549, 27 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Surr. Ct.
1941).
16 172 Misc. 950, 16 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Surr. Ct.
1939).
The decision of the Court in the present
case is supported by the weight of author-
ity. The courts recognize no distinction
between masses for the repose of the souls
of particular people and those for the pro-
motion of religion in general. The confu-
sion engendered in this area by the Brown,
Breckwolt and Steiner cases has probably
been dispelled, not only in New York, but
also in those states which have statutes
somewhat similar to Section 17.17 It would
be well, therefore, when drafting wills pro-
viding for bequests for masses, to refer to
statutes which place limitations on gifts
for religious purposes. Since such bequests
would be for laudable ends, every attempt
should be made to effectuate the testator's
intent.
Prior Restraint
The film "Lady Chatterly's Lover" fur-
nished the occasion for the New York
Court of Appeals' most recent pronounce-
ment in the uncertain area of administrative
censorship of motion pictures.' The Appel-
late Division had annulled a determination
by the Board of Regents denying a license
to exhibit the film under Section 122-a of
the Education Law, which requires a denial
of a license to films which portray sexual
immorality as desirable behavior. In revers-
17 The following statutes similar to Section 17
place some restriction on bequests for religious or
charitable purposes:
CALIF. PROB. CODE ANN. §§40-43 (West 1956);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §731.19 (Supp. 1957); GA. CODE
ANN. § 113-104 (Supp. 1955); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§14-326 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. §633.3 (1950);
MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 68, §9 (1953); MISS. CODE
ANN. §671 (1943); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§91-142 (1949); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2107.06
(Baldwin 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §17
(Supp. 1957).
1 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 19 LAW
REP. NEWS No. 38, p. 1, col. 2 (N.Y. Ct. App.
May 15, 1958).
ing the order of the Appellate Division, the
Court held, with three dissents, that since
Section 122-a was not unconstitutional,
either on grounds of vagueness or as an
invalid prior restraint, the license to exhibit
the film was properly denied.
Chief Judge Conway, in an opinion con-
curred in by Judges Froessel and Burke,
stressed the distinction between the motion
picture and other media of communication
- a distinction rooted in a capacity for
harm to the public order that warrants
unique remedial measures and standards.
Relying on a test based on the net effect
of Section 122-a in operation, considered
through "close analysis" and "pragmatic
assessments" similar to that laid down by
the Supreme Court, 2 Chief Judge Conway
found that the net effect of a film is the
same whether it contains a dominance of
suggestive scenes or fewer such scenes pre-
sented as desirable conduct. Both are dan-
gerous to the moral tone of society and
can be censored, and since the pernicious
influence of such films on the social order
is inherent in them, no clear and present
danger to society need be proved before a
license to exhibit the film can be denied.
In a separate opinion, Judge Desmond
confessed a doubt as to the constitutionality
of Section 122-a but concurred because the
United States Supreme Court has never
passed on a similar statute; he added that
if it were unconstitutional, it would be the
function of the Supreme Court to so hold.
Judges Dye and Fuld not only believed
the statute to be too vague, but also em-
phasized that prior restraint of films should
not be permitted where it would not be
tolerated if books were involved. Judge
2 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436
(1957).
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Van Voorhis also considered the statute to
be too indefinite but implicitly recognized
the validity of some censorship insofar as
he recommended remand to the Regents to
remove obscene parts.
The area of administrative censorship of
films has been marked by much uncertainty
since Burstyn v. Wilson3 afforded to motion
pictures the protection of the First Amend-
ment, which had theretofore been denied
to them. 4 In that case the United States
Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment
on whether a state could, under a clearly
drawn statute, prevent the showing of ob-
scene films.-' The result has been much
litigation involving the constitutionality of
particular licensing statutes, during the
course of which the Supreme Court has
struck down censorship predicated on the
ground that a film is "immoral"' ; or that
it tends to "debase and corrupt morals ' 7 or
that it is not of a moral, educational, or
amusing and harmless character." The atti-
tude of the Supreme Court in the cases that
have arisen has led some to believe that
no prior restraint of films should be per-
mitted, but the Supreme Court has never
3 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
4 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236
U.S. 230 (1915). This case did not treat motion
pictures as akin to. the press and hence excluded
them from the protection of the First Amendment.
5 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1952).
6 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S.
587 (1954) (per curiam), reversing 305 N.Y. 336,
113 N.E.2d 502 (1953). The New York court had
construed "immoral" as relating to sexual immo-
rality but the Supreme Court did not permit this
construction to save the statute.
7 Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S.
870 (per curiam), reversing 177 Kan. 728, 282
P.2d 412 (1955).
s Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346
U.S. 587 (per curiam), reversing 159 Ohio St.
315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1954).
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expressly so held. In fact, it has hinted to
the contrary. 9
In Near v. Minnesota,10 the Supreme
Court declared that' the exceptions to the
rule of no prior restraint include that type
of speech which hinders the conduct of a
war, seditious speech, and speech which
goes contrary to the primary requirements
of decency. 1 In Beauharnais v. Illinois
12
the Court, sustaining a conviction for group
libel, stated that libelous speech is not
within the protection of the First Amend-
ment.13 In Roth v. United States,14 obscen-
ity was held to be without the protection
of the Constitution, with the result that
a clear and present danger to society caused
by the obscenity did not have to be proved.
Lastly, in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire15 the Supreme Court said:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous .... [S]uch utterances
... are of such slight social value ... that
any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. 16
Moreover, the Court has recognized that
motion pictures can raise special problems
and hence are not necessarily subject to
the criteria that are applicable to other
9 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
10 283 U.S. 697 (1931 ).
11 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
12 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
13 Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 9, at 260.
14 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
15 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942).
means of communication.17 Its policy of
testing the constitutionality of specific stat-
utes case by case, rather than flatly de-
claring that all forms of licensing are
unconstitutional, bolsters the conviction
that different standards are applicable to
motion pictures.' 8
It should be noted that the distinction
relied on by Judge Fuld (who upheld the
use of the injunction in a prior case'9 but
opposed administrative censorship in the
principal case) between judicial and ad-
ministrative prior restraint, does not appear
sufficient to warrant holding Section 122-a
unconstitutional. 20 To determine if a par-
ticular licensing statute is constitutional the
Supreme Court has relied on a test based
on the net effect of the Operation of the
statute, regardless of its administrative or
judicial provisions. 21
However, since the Supreme Court has
thus far failed to sustain a determination
made under a film licensing statute, it
would appear that to comply with the tenor
of the Supreme Court opinions, censorship
must be very closely confined. The convic-
tions that have been sustained have been
under subsequent punishment statutes. 22
Even in cases where a conviction has been
sustained, there have been strong dissents
17Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03
(1952).
18 See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
19 See Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., I N.Y.2d
177, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956).
20 See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436, 441-42 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (193 1); Freund, The Supreme Court and
Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 539 (1951).
21 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
22 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942).
and carefully worded concurring opinions.2 3
A problem would seem to arise, in view
of the Roth case,2 4 as to whether obscenity
is the only ground upon which a censoring
statute could be sustained. This was Judge
Desmond's position in the Excelsior Pic-
tures case 23 but in the present case he con-
cedes that censorship may be on grounds
other than the dictionary definition of ob-
scenity. 26 The Roth case framed a definition
of obscenity based on the dominant appeal
of an object to the prurient interest,2 7 and
it may be argued that "Lady Chatterly's
Lover" does not fall within the scope of
this definition. However, when the fact that
the Roth case did not hold obscenity to be
the only ground is considered in relation
to the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in the Kingsley Books case,2 8 it would
23 See Roth v. United States, supra note 22, at
494, 496, 508; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
supra note 19, at 445, 446, 447. The tenor of these
opinions renders the outcome of any test of a
licensing statute at best uncertain.
24 Roth v. United States, note 22 supra.
25 Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d
237, 144 N.E.2d 31 (1957). In the controversial
"Garden of Eden" case the Court of Appeals an-
nulled action by the Regents denying a license to
the film on the ground that it was indecent. This
was regarded as too vague to serve as a constitu-
tional standard of censorship; since the film was
deemed not obscene by the majority it could not
be banned. The majority regarded obscenity as the
only ground upon which films could be censored.
26 Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 19 LAW
REP. NEWS No. 38, p. 1, col. 2 (N.Y. Ct. App.
May 15, 1958) (concurring opinion of Desmond,
J.).
27 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957).
28 See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S.
436 (1957). The Court said that the use of an
injunction to prevent the distribution of obscene
literature was not violative of the Fourteenth
4 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1958
appear that a film could constitutionally be
banned although not within the strict pur-
view of the prurient interest test. The Kings-
ley Books case stressed the fact that words
like "prior restraint" could not be regarded
as "talismanic tests."' 29 In that case the
Court found that an injunction operated
similarly to permissible criminal statutes.
It is conceivable that "prurient interest"
may be similarly treated and due consider-
ation given by the Supreme Court to the
practical effect of a given statute and the
needs of society. Certainly, the emphasis
which the majority placed on the distinc-
tion between films and other means of com-
munication can be used to distinguish
general statements, made in cases not in-
volving films, from the case at hand.
While the tenor of some Supreme Court
opinions cannot be ignored,30 it seems not
enough to warrant Judge Desmond's pessi-
mism. The statute in the principal case
appears to be confined sufficiently, leaving
a minimum of discretion to the censor, and
hence should withstand the challenge of
unconstitutionality before the United States
Supreme Court if the present case is ap-
pealed.
Amendment. The Court examined the net opera-
tion of the statute and found that its effect was
not substantially different from that of permissible
subsequent punishment statutes.
29 id. at 441.
30 The dissents in the Kingsley Books case em-
phasized that an injunction would deprive the
defendants of a right to a jury trial. Id. at 445,
446, 447. The New York Court of Appeals had
indicated that since the offense was a misde-
meanor the defendants had no constitutional right
to a jury trial. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N.Y.2d
177, 134 N.E.2d 461 (1956). But see, Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958) (per
curiam), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).

